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Abstract 
The crisis Argentina faced in the late 1980s legitimized a diagnosis that linked the 
country’s poor economic performance to an inward‐looking economy, excessive fiscal 
spending, unwarranted state regulations, a misguided set of incentives that failed to 
boost competitiveness and the “economic populism” that privileged political goals over 
economic efficiency. Alternatively, the solution was sought in policies that privileged 
deregulation, the free flow of commodities and capital, privatization and a selective 
intervention of the state in the economy. In this article we will account for the shape of 
neoliberal restructuring in Argentina by drawing attention to the heavy costs 
stabilization imposed on the country as the decade progressed. We will emphasize the 
costs the workers were called on to bear and the responses that emerged from them to 
challenge neoliberalism. 
 
Résumé   
La crise qui a frappé l’Argentine à la fin des années 1980 a justifié un diagnostic qui liait 
la faible performance économique à plusieurs facteurs : le caractère endogène de son 
économie, les dépenses excessives de l’État, les réglementations mal avisées, les 
stimulants mal ciblés qui ne sont pas parvenus à soutenir la compétitivité et le 
« populisme économique » qui privilégiait les finalités politiques plutôt que l’efficacité 
économique. En réponse à ce diagnostic, les solutions privilégiées visaient la 
déréglementation, la libre circulation des marchandises et du capital, les privatisations 
et l’intervention ciblée de l’État dans l’économie. Cet article présente la configuration 
des réformes néolibérales en Argentine en insistant sur les coûts élevés que la 
stabilisation a entraînés au cours de la décennie. Nous soulignons l’importance du 
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fardeau imposé aux travailleurs et travailleuses ainsi que leurs réactions pour contrer le 
néolibéralisme. 
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During	the	1990s,	Argentina	underwent	a	process	of	structural	adjustment	
with	unique	characteristics	in	terms	of	both	its	intensity	and	its	scope.	
Reforms	gained	momentum	after	the	implementation	of	a	stabilization	
plan	that	rapidly	tempered	rates	of	inflation	that	were	exorbitant	even	for	
a	country	that	had	been	experiencing	constant	price	spikes	of	notorious	
intensity	since	at	least	the	1960s.	These	reforms	encompassed	the	
essential	ingredients	of	what	we	have	come	to	refer	to	as	neoliberalism.	In	
particular,	throughout	the	decade,	there	was	an	unremitting	tendency	to	
position	fiscal	austerity,	the	reform	of	state	institutions	and	the	further	
flexibilization	of	labour	markets	as	essential	variables	for	addressing	the	
obstacles	to	economic	growth	that	increasingly	tarnished	the	original	
success	of	stabilization	in	reactivating	a	seriously	troubled	economy.	
Specifically,	it	became	a	priority—as	it	had	repeatedly	in	the	past—to	
debilitate	a	labour	movement	with	the	organizational	power	to	jeopardize	
the	restructuring	plans	of	the	government.	Another	priority	was,	most	
certainly,	to	produce	the	reduction	in	labour	costs	required	to	make	the	
entire	package	of	reforms	viable.			
	 In	this	article,	we	will	account	for	the	shape	that	neoliberal	
restructuring	acquired	in	Argentina	by	drawing	attention	to	the	steep	costs	
that	stability	entailed	for	the	country	as	the	decade	progressed.	We	will	
place	particular	emphasis	on	the	costs	that	workers	were	called	upon	to	
bear,	as	well	as	the	responses	that—despite	the	difficulties	normally	
entailed	in	organizing	an	increasingly	heterogeneous	working	class—
emerged	in	their	challenge	to	neoliberalism.		
	
Hyperinflation and Neoliberal Reforms  
The	1980s	was	the	decade	of	the	transition	to	democracy	and	the	failed	
attempt	to	reverse	the	effects	of	the	orthodox	economic	policies	of	the	
previous	dictatorship.	The	government	of	Raúl	Alfonsín	(1983‐1989)	
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centred	its	economic	policies	on	resuming	growth	by	implementing	
traditional	Keynesian	policies,	stabilizing	the	economy	and	overcoming	the	
debt	crisis	in	a	sustainable	manner.	However,	the	government	failed	on	
most	counts,	and	by	1988,	its	decision	to	postpone	debt	servicing	created	
the	conditions	for	a	speculative	run	against	the	Argentinian	currency	led	by	
creditor	banks	and	a	hyperinflationary	episode	in	1989	(Azpiazu,	
Basualdo,	and	Notcheff	1998,	18).	This	episode	has	been	defined	as	an	
economic	“coup	d’état,”	as	it	generated	an	extreme	exacerbation	of	
distributive	conflicts	where	the	big	winners	were	the	most	concentrated	
capitalist	fractions.		
	 The	scope	of	the	crisis	at	that	time	was	also	a	crucial	element	in	
cementing	the	consensus	about	the	exhaustion	of	the	import	substitution	
strategy	and	Keynesian	macroeconomic	policies	and,	especially,	about	the	
need	to	reform	the	state.	As	it	happened	elsewhere,	the	“natural”	solution	
was	to	downsize	the	state,	to	open	the	borders	for	trade	and	finance,	to	
eliminate	unnecessary	regulations	that	purportedly	distorted	the	
operation	of	markets	and	to	strengthen	the	rule	of	law	and	the	institutional	
arrangements	in	order	to	create	a	favourable	climate	for	investments.	The	
need	to	leave	extreme	instability	behind	also	legitimized	the	costs	and	
sacrifices	associated	with	these	reforms	and,	to	some	extent,	explain	the	
swift	pace	and	radical	nature	of	reforms	in	the	country.	
	 State	indebtedness—one	of	the	problems	that	both	triggered	and	
justified	reforms—paradoxically	became	a	characteristic	feature	of	the	
period,	as	reforms	gradually	created	the	conditions	and	the	increasing	
need	for	the	state	to	borrow	in	international	financial	markets.	In	turn,	
mounting	sovereign	debt	created	conditions	for	specific	forms	of	
subordinating	the	domestic	economy,	public	policy	and	the	institutional	
structure	of	the	state	to	the	vagaries	of	capital	flight	and	to	the	monitoring	
and	conditionality	of	credit	rating	agencies	and	the	international	financial	
institutions	(IFIs).	This	subordination	has	produced	changes	in	the	
working	of	the	state,	the	distribution	of	wealth	and	the	balances	of	power	
between	capital	and	labour	that	have	largely	transcended	the	juncture	in	
which	these	policies	were	implemented.		
	 When	the	negative	effects	of	the	reforms	themselves	became	
evident,	the	threat	of	a	return	of	hyperinflation	justified	further	structural	
reforms,	fiscal	adjustment,	and	the	reduction	of	the	so‐called	“Argentinian	
cost”	(mainly,	the	cost	of	the	labour	force).	Moreover,	the	poor	
performance	of	the	Argentinian	economy	during	most	of	the	1990s,	its	
vulnerability	to	international	financial	crises	and	the	critical	loss	of	
confidence	on	the	part	of	portfolio	investors	during	the	second	half	of	the	
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decade	were	attributed	to	the	persistence	of	illiberal	enclaves	and	the	
deceleration	of	reforms.	Thus,	the	need	to	protect	what	had	been	achieved	
and	move	forward	with	the	elimination	of	still	existing	obstacles	to	
restructuring	took	precedence	over	the	increasing	costs	that	reforms	were	
palpably	inflicting	on	workers	and	other	social	groups.	Recession,	falling	
tax	collection	and	higher	country	risk	premiums	on	sovereign	borrowing	
were	strong	incentives	for	deepening	fiscal	austerity,	while	growing	
unemployment	and	the	falling	competitiveness	of	domestic	production	
justified	declining	wages	and	labour	flexibilization.	As	the	explosive	
economic,	political	and	social	crisis	of	2001	made	painfully	evident,	
reforms	failed	to	deliver	sustainable	growth	with	increased	social	welfare	
as	promised	by	their	defenders.	But	the	reformist	strategy	was	effective	in	
creating	numerous	spaces	for	accumulation,	altering	the	power	of	social	
actors	to	place	their	demands	on	the	state	and	tightening	the	links	between	
the	domestic	economy	and	global	finance.		
	
The Virtuous Stage of Neoliberal Reforms 
In	July	1989,	amidst	a	200	percent	monthly	rate	of	inflation,	President	
Carlos	Menem	(1989‐1999)	came	to	power	announcing	a	drastic	fiscal	
adjustment	and	an	ambitious	reform	of	the	state	and	the	economy	
heralded	as	the	only	alternative	in	order	to	leave	instability	and	stagnation	
definitively	behind,	solve	the	debt	crisis,	attract	investments	and,	
ultimately,	foster	growth	and	welfare.		This	state	reform	consisted	of	the	
privatization	of	public	assets,	a	major	bureaucratic	downsizing	and	the	
liberalization	of	the	economy.	Reforms	created	favourable	conditions	for	
renegotiating	the	defaulted	sovereign	debt	and	attracted	foreign	direct	and	
portfolio	investments	that	would	be	central	for	the	sustainability	of	the	
macroeconomic	stabilization	program	imposed	in	1991.	
	 In	April	1991,	economic	authorities	announced	the	implementation	
of	a	currency	peg.	The	so‐called	Convertibility	Program	consisted	of	a	
legislated	fixed	exchange	rate	of	10,000	australes	per	US	dollar.1	Full	
backing	in	US	dollars,	gold,	or	dollar‐nominated	bonds	was	required	for	
circulating	australes,	and	the	US	dollar	was	established	as	legal	tender.	
Price	indexation—a	practice	that	had	become	habitual	in	economic	
transactions—was	prohibited,	and	wage	increases	were	made	conditional	
upon	productivity	gains.	This	way,	the	creation	of	money	became	
subordinated	to	capital	inflows	or,	what	is	the	same,	money	was	
                                                 
1 In 1992, the peso replaced the austral. The peso stood at 1 US dollar throughout the decade 
of Convertibility. 
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transformed	into	an	exogenous	variable	beyond	the	control	of	domestic	
monetary	authorities	(Schvarzer	1998).	The	underlying	assumption	behind	
the	measure	was	that	monetary	and	fiscal	indiscipline	were	a	main	cause	of	
instability.	Thus,	by	limiting	the	possibility	of	increasing	the	monetary	
supply,	the	state	would	be	forced	to	eliminate	its	deficit.	It	would	also	be	
forced	to	carry	out	policies	that	strengthened	investor	confidence	in	order	
to	regain	access	to	voluntary	credit.	The	Convertibility	Plan	was	
accompanied	by	tariff	reduction,	the	deregulation	of	many	economic	
activities,	the	elimination	of	restrictions	on	foreign	investments,	the	
expansion	of	the	number	of	state	assets	to	be	privatized	and	the	reform	of	
the	Charter	of	the	Central	Bank.2		Several	bills	were	sent	to	Congress	to	
modify	the	tax	structure	and	tax	management,	including	tax	increases	and	
strategies	to	improve	tax	collection	and	fight	evasion.	Convertibility	
succeeded	in	stabilizing	the	economy	and	creating	conditions	for	a	period	
of	growth.3	This	original	success	was	pivotal	in	strengthening	the	
legitimacy	of	neoliberal	reforms	and	creating	the	conditions	for	a	
“triumphalism”	that	overshadowed	any	consideration	of	either	the	effects	
on	workers	or	the	number	of	enduring	macroeconomic,	fiscal	and	external	
imbalances.		
	 Interestingly,	the	celebration	of	the	role	of	reforms	in	definitively	
solving	the	crisis	coexisted	with	arguments	about	the	persistence	of	
threats	to	stability.	An	ever‐fragile	stabilization	justified	further	fiscal	
adjustment	and	made	its	social	costs	inescapable.	Hence,	the	poor	
performance	of	the	labour	market	and	the	need	to	raise	the	international	
competitiveness	of	the	domestic	economy	justified	a	series	of	changes	in	
labour	regulations	whose	purpose	was	to	“flexibilize”	labour	markets	and	
reduce	labour	costs.	
	 In	1993,	Argentina	joined	the	Brady	Plan	to	restructure	the	public	
debt.	Through	it,	the	principal	of	the	debt	and	part	of	the	outstanding	
interests	were	securitized	with	zero	coupon	bonds	from	the	US	Treasury	
acquired	with	funds	lent	by	the	IFIs	(Fernández	et	al.	2007,	15).	The	Brady	
                                                 
2 The reform eliminated the Central Bank’s function of lender‐of‐last resort and further 
restricted its role as regulator of monetary supply. These restrictions were later “flexibilized” 
to give the Central Bank instruments to assist private banks with the purpose of controlling the 
disruptive effects of the Tequila crisis (see below) on the domestic financial system. 
3 Inflation fell from a monthly 27 percent in February 1991 to 11 percent in March and 5.5 
percent in April. With some exceptions, the CPI continued to fall during the rest of the decade 
(INDEC, n.d.‐b). After falling 2.5 percent in 1990, the GDP grew 9.1 percent in 1991, 7.9 
percent in 1992 and 8.2 percent in 1993. Growth decelerated in the following years (INDEC, 
n.d.‐c).  
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agreement	did	not	provide	significant	debt	relief	but	had	positive	effects	on	
banks’	portfolios,	as	they	were	able	to	transform	defaulted	credits,	
including	past	interest,	into	new	debt	bonds	(Damill	et	al.	2005,	42).	It	also	
signalled	Argentina’s	comeback	to	international	capital	markets	and	was	
the	starting	point	of	a	new	cycle	of	state	indebtedness	that	took	the	public	
debt	to	unprecedented	levels	(Gambina	2003,	5‐8).	In	the	following	years,	
borrowing	would	be	a	main	element	for	financing	the	activity	of	the	state	
and	offsetting	the	growing	current	account	deficit.	As	the	devaluation	of	
the	peso	was	precluded	by	law,	the	government’s	efforts	to	boost	the	
competitiveness	of	domestic	production	and	to	soothe	the	demands	of	
domestic	industrial	corporations	and	exporters	negatively	affected	by	
external	competition	were	concentrated	on	reducing	taxes	and	labour	
costs.	This	was	in	addition	to	dismissals	associated	with	the	process	of	
privatization	of	public	sector	companies,	successive	rounds	of	fiscal	
adjustment	and	a	freeze	on	wages	that	reduced	workers’	incomes	and	the	
disciplinary	effects	of	growing	unemployment.	The	outcome	was	a	
momentous	increase	in	unemployment	as	well	as	social	turmoil.		
	 In	summary,	the	period	of	stabilization	and	expansion	was	not	
characterized	by	the	creation	of	employment.	Neither	was	it	a	period	of	
sustained	improvements	in	workers’	incomes	(Baer	et	al.	2002,	67‐69;	
Frenkel	2002,	45‐46).	However,	poverty	dropped,	and	wage	earners	and	
other	groups	especially	vulnerable	to	the	effects	of	inflation	were	benefited	
by	stability	and	by	the	expansion	of	credit.	The	latter	improved	the	
purchasing	power	of	some	groups	of	formal	workers	and	middle‐income	
sectors,	thus	reinforcing	the	legitimacy	of	the	program	and	increasing	the	
obstacles	to	any	changes	in	the	exchange	regime	that	would	eventually	
affect	debtors	that	had	borrowed	in	dollars.	Convertibility	put	an	end	to	
long‐term	forms	of	distributive	conflict	that	had	been	at	the	root	of	high	
inflation.	Ultimately,	the	commitment	to	maintaining	the	fixed	exchange	
rate	in	a	context	of	trade	and	financial	openness	prevented	the	state	from	
regulating	the	effects	of	international	financial	turmoil	and	improving	the	
international	competitiveness	of	domestic	production.		
	
From Boom to Crisis 
Until	early	1994,	capital	inflows	favoured	the	accumulation	of	foreign	
reserves,	the	expansion	of	credit,	economic	growth	and	consumption.	The	
situation	took	a	turn	for	the	worse	in	February	1994,	when	the	rise	of	
international	interest	rates	reduced	capital	inflows	to	emerging	markets.	
The	gradual	overvaluation	of	the	domestic	currency	and	the	growing	trade	
deficit	that	resulted	from	the	stabilization	program	made	Argentina	
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extremely	vulnerable	to	the	change	in	the	international	financial	climate	
(Damill	et	al.	2002,	10).	The	domestic	economy	was	severely	hit	by	the	
“Tequila	crisis”,	which	reversed	capital	flows	and	forced	a	drastic	
reduction	in	money	supply	to	offset	the	losses	of	the	Central	Bank’s	
reserves.	Credit	fell,	and	the	economy	entered	into	a	recessive	period	in	
which	unemployment	and	poverty	grew	(Baer	et	al.	2002,	75).	A	bailout	of	
the	domestic	banking	system	organized	by	the	Central	Bank,	along	with	
IMF	assistance	and	a	drastic	fiscal	adjustment,	succeeded	in	stopping	
massive	capital	outflows	and	preventing	the	breakdown	of	the	currency	
peg.	The	crisis	also	triggered	a	new	round	of	reforms,	in	particular,	a	
banking	restructuring	aimed	to	eliminate	weaker	local	banks	and	promote	
the	concentration	and	transnationalization	of	the	system,	the	reform	of	
provincial	states	to	streamline	provincial	budgets	and	the	transformation	
of	public	education	and	health	care	systems	with	the	objectives	of	
rationalizing	spending	and	modernizing	them	with	managerial	
technocratic	criteria	(Felder	2009,	62).4		
	 After	the	Tequila	crisis,	the	state	regained	access	to	credit,	creating	
the	conditions	for	an	economic	recovery.	Similarly,	state	borrowing	helped	
to	overcome	the	effects	of	the	South	Asian	crisis	in	1997.	But	the	impact	of	
the	Russian	crisis	was	extremely	severe	and,	in	the	context	of	the	currency	
peg,	irreversible.	The	country	risk	premium	rose	to	unprecedented	levels,	
capital	inflows	fell	dramatically,	and	the	economy	(especially	the	banking	
system)	became	increasingly	dollarized	(Damill	et	al.	2002,	10‐11).	The	
rise	of	the	country	risk	premium	increased	the	cost	of	borrowing	and,	with	
it,	fiscal	hardship.	As	evidence	of	its	commitment	to	servicing	its	
international	obligations	and	regaining	investor	confidence,	the	state	
deepened	its	drive	to	reduce	public	spending	and	implement	additional	
structural	reforms.	
	 However,	fiscal	discipline	failed	to	reverse	recession	or	to	regain	
fiscal	balance.	The	Brazilian	crisis	and	devaluation	of	1999	exacerbated	
both	the	existing	recession	and	fiscal	hardship,	as	it	restricted	access	to	the	
main	market	for	Argentinian	exports	and	aggravated	the	overvaluation	of	
the	domestic	currency	(Baer	et	al.	2002,	74‐75).	In	this	context	of	deflation,	
growing	unemployment	and	poverty,	the	efforts	of	the	government	were	
aimed	at	demonstrating	its	will	to	meet	the	state’s	financial	commitments	
                                                 
4 In general terms, all these reforms failed to attain their stated goals. A more 
transnationalized banking system fell short to prevent the financial crisis of 2001, provinces 
were increasingly unable to deal with growing social demands and falling resources and the 
performance of the public schools and hospitals fell to unprecedented levels.   
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by	means	of	further	fiscal	adjustment,	institutional	reforms	and	repression	
and	control	of	social	protests	combined	with	selective	clientelistic	hand‐
outs.	But	the	combination	of	poor	economic	performance,	generalized	
social	discontent	and	widespread	government	corruption	led	to	the	
electoral	defeat	of	the	party	in	power	and	the	coming	to	power	of	Fernando	
de	la	Rúa	(1999‐2001),	the	candidate	of	the	Alliance	for	Work,	Education	
and	Justice	(Alianza	por	el	Trabajo,	la	Educación	y	la	Justicia).	
	
Hyperdeflation	and	the	End	of	Convertibility	
When	de	la	Rúa	took	power,	recession	seemed	hard	to	reverse;	debt	
servicing	demanded	a	growing	share	of	falling	state	revenues	and	the	
country	risk	premium	was	growing	geometrically.	Consequently,	doubts	
about	the	ability	of	the	country	to	meet	its	financial	commitments	
mushroomed.	The	government	responded	by	announcing	a	new	fiscal	
adjustment	plan	that	included	a	cut	in	public	employees’	nominal	wages,	
the	elimination	and	merging	of	state	agencies,	a	rise	in	the	VAT	(Value	
Added	Tax),	the	postponement	of	public	works	and	the	elimination	of	
several	social	assistance	programs,	among	other	savings.	The	adjustment	
was	justified	on	the	grounds	that	international	trustworthiness	would	help	
to	reduce	the	country	risk	premium	and	attract	capital	inflows,	leading	to	
economic	recovery	and,	with	it,	improved	tax	collection.	In	addition,	the	
government	attempted	to	counteract	the	effects	of	the	currency	
overvaluation	on	the	competitiveness	of	domestic	production	by	
deepening	labour	market	flexibility	and	reducing	payroll	taxes.	Predictably,	
the	draconian	fiscal	adjustment	aggravated	the	already	serious	recession	
and	affected	tax	collection.	The	fall	in	state	revenues	further	increased	the	
country	risk	premium,	forcing	the	government	to	pay	extraordinarily	high	
interest	rates	to	roll	over	the	public	debt	and	intensifying	doubts	about	the	
ability	of	the	state	to	service	it	(Damill	et	al.	2002,	12).	Facing	a	“crisis	of	
confidence”,	in	December	2000	the	government	obtained	a	preventive	
loan,	administrated	by	the	IMF	and	contributed	to	by	the	Fund	itself,	the	
World	Bank,	the	Inter‐American	Development	Bank	and	the	Spanish	state,	
as	well	as	some	international	private	banks.	Even	though	the	loan	was	
presented	as	an	instrument	for	boosting	economic	activity,	in	a	manner	
congruent	with	the	IMF’s	policy	priorities,	the	intention	was	actually	to	
protect	creditors	against	a	probable	default.	The	quid	pro	quo	was	the	
commitment	to	introducing	additional	budgetary	reductions	and	
modifying	the	retirement	and	healthcare	systems	in	order	to	reduce	future	
state	contributions	and	expand	the	room	for	private	capital	accumulation	
within	them.		
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	 As	the	recession	continued,	tax	collection	did	not	improve,	and	the	
government	failed	to	meet	the	commitments	included	in	its	agreement	
with	the	IMF,	which	led	the	institution	to	cancel	the	release	of	funds.	In	
March	2001,	a	plan	to	impose	a	drastic	fiscal	cut	that	would	especially	
affect	public	education	was	blocked	by	massive	social	protests.	Soon	after,	
Congress	passed	a	bill	that	granted	the	economy	minister	extraordinary	
powers	to	reduce	the	fiscal	deficit,	but	which,	nonetheless,	failed	to	restore	
lenders’	confidence.	Instead,	the	recessive	effects	of	state	austerity	and	its	
effects	on	tax	collection	enhanced	doubts	about	the	ability	of	the	country	to	
meet	its	financial	commitments,	thus	increasing	the	country	risk	premium.	
	 In	order	to	alleviate	the	burden	of	debt	servicing,	in	March	2001	the	
government	implemented	an	exchange	of	existing	sovereign	debt	bonds	for	
new	bonds	with	longer	maturity	and	higher	interest	rates.	The	bond	
exchange	and	the	new	fiscal	adjustment	proposal	helped	to	unlock	IMF	
lending.	However,	they	did	not	have	any	significant	effect	on	the	country	
risk	premium,	nor	did	they	stop	capital	flight.		
	 As	the	crisis	worsened,	the	government	renewed	its	commitment	to	
maintaining	Convertibility	and	prioritizing	the	financial	commitments	of	
the	state	over	any	other	goal.	In	July	2001,	the	government	announced	a	
“zero‐deficit”	policy,	making	state	spending	other	than	debt	servicing	
conditional	upon	the	availability	of	fiscal	resources.	Nominal	public	sector	
wages	and	retirement	pensions	were	immediately	reduced	by	13	percent,	
and	plans	were	made	for	further	reductions	in	the	future.	This	new	fiscal	
adjustment	also	failed	to	solve	the	financial	hardship	of	the	state,	but	it	
fuelled	social	anger	and	resistance	to	austerity,	destroying	the	already	thin	
legitimacy	of	the	government	(Felder	2007).	
	 The	failure	of	a	new	attempt	to	restructure	the	sovereign	debt	in	
October	2001	accelerated	capital	flight.	After	international	institutional	
investors	and	banks	had	left	the	country,	the	IMF	lost	its	interest	in	
protecting	the	Argentinian	economy,	blocking	its	disbursements	and	
pushing	for	a	default,	a	restructuring	of	the	public	debt,	a	devaluation	and	a	
deepening	of	fiscal	adjustment	and	structural	reforms.	However,	
prominent	members	of	the	Argentinian	government	were	more	inclined	to	
dollarize	the	economy	(as	a	way	to	eliminating	exchange	risk).	As	the	
dollarization	was	unfeasible,	a	desperate	attempt	to	maintain	the	peg	was	
made	in	December	2001.	Responding	to	massive	withdrawals	of	bank	
savings,	the	government	imposed	restrictions	preventing	bank	customers	
from	withdrawing	their	savings,	the	so‐called	“corralito”.	The	corralito	
transformed	the	recession	into	a	paralysis	and	social	anger	into	a	revolt	
that	forced	de	la	Rúa’s	resignation.	During	the	following	weeks,	the	country	
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defaulted	on	part	of	its	sovereign	debt	and	devalued	the	currency.	The	
devaluation	required	a	revision	of	the	legal	and	institutional	framework	
that	had	ruled	the	economy	during	the	1990s	and	triggered	fierce	struggles	
around	the	distribution	of	the	costs	of	the	crisis	and	the	orientation	of	the	
recovery.		
	 After	the	devaluation,	inflation	re‐emerged	in	a	deeply	recessive	
context.	Attempts	to	follow	the	IMF’s	recommendations	to	deepen	fiscal	
discipline	and	further	liberalize	the	economy	met	massive	social	resistance	
and	aggravated	the	existing	economic	instability	and	recession.	The	
economic	situation	started	to	change	in	mid‐2002,	when—disregarding	
IMF	requirements—the	economic	authorities	made	the	decision	to	
intervene	in	the	exchange	market	and	to	regulate	capital	movements	in	
order	to	control	the	devaluation	of	the	currency.	The	subsequent	
stabilization	and	a	more	competitive	exchange	rate	created	the	conditions	
for	an	economic	recovery.		
	 A	process	of	political	“normalization”	that	included	a	call	for	
presidential	elections	and	a	gradual	decline	of	social	mobilization	
accompanied	the	economic	recovery.	In	April	2003,	Néstor	Kirchner	
(2003‐2007),	then	governor	of	a	province	in	southern	Argentina,	won	the	
election.	Given	the	recognition	of	the	political	impossibility	of	solving	the	
crisis	with	traditional	neoliberal	instruments,	Kirchner’s	policies	have	been	
interpreted	by	many	analysts	as	a	signal	of	the	end	of	neoliberalism.	
Nonetheless,	the	depth	of	the	transformation	that	neoliberalism	brought	to	
the	country	has	proven	difficult	to	change.		
	
Working under Neoliberalism: Reshaping the Meaning of Work 
As	we	have	suggested	above,	the	program	of	structural	reforms	in	
Argentina	under	the	aegis	of	a	fixed	exchange‐rate	regime	created	a	very	
particular	set	of	economic	circumstances,	with	deleterious	consequences	
for	workers.	One	key	variable	in	the	determination	of	this	problem	was	the	
performance	of	the	industrial	sector.	Immediately	after	the	stabilization,	
domestic	industry	underwent	a	process	of	expansion	and	rationalization.	
Investments	in	new	technologies	combined	with	the	reorganization	of	
labour	processes	and	changes	in	labour	regulations	resulted	in	accelerated	
growth,	with	higher	labour	productivity	and	a	reduction	in	the	number	of	
jobs	per	unit	(Frenkel	2002,	46).	Gradually,	the	appreciation	of	the	
domestic	currency	in	combination	with	trade	liberalization	forced	a	large	
number	of	firms	out	of	the	market.	Those	who	survived	the	competition	
from	artificially	low‐priced	imports	did	so	by	replacing	an	increasingly	
expensive	labour	force	with	capital	equipment	that	overvaluation	had	
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made	cheaper	to	acquire	(Chitarroni	and	Cimillo	2007,	7).	Both	trends—
the	elimination	of	less	competitive	firms	and	growing	investment	in	
labour‐saving	technology—resulted	in	rising	levels	of	unemployment.	As	
we	have	mentioned	above,	the	privatization	of	state	companies	became	
another	source	of	labour	displacement.	The	negative	performance	of	
employment	was	also	related	to	the	changing	structure	of	exports.	The	
production	of	these	exports	was	intensive	in	the	use	of	primary	resources	
and	capital	and	thus	could	not	provide	a	dynamic	alternative	for	the	
absorption	of	workers	displaced	from	other	economic	activities	
undergoing	major	restructuring	during	the	1990s	(Nochteff	1998,	32).	
	 The	nature	of	economic	growth	and	decline	during	the	1990s	was,	
then,	a	critical	variable	in	the	radical	transformation	of	labour	markets	in	
Argentina.	The	following	statistics	provide	a	good	indication	of	the	
devastating	results	of	neoliberalism.	Unemployment	increased	from	6	
percent	in	1991	to	18.3	percent	in	2001,	with	underemployment	affecting	
an	additional	16.3	percent	of	workers.	In	2000,	the	number	of	precarious	
jobs—that	is,	work	that	does	not	provide	healthcare,	social	security,	paid	
vacations	or	other	forms	of	protection—	increased	to	40	percent,	from	
26.7	percent	in	1990.	These	figures	only	worsened	after	the	meltdown	in	
December	2001	and	early	2002.	Thus,	by	May	2002,	the	percentage	of	
unemployment	had	risen	to	21.5	percent	and	underemployment	to	18.6	
percent.		Figures	for	poverty	and	indigence	levels	reached	their	all‐time	
historical	high	in	modern	Argentina	in	May	2002,	when	53	percent	of	the	
population	was	living	below	the	poverty	line,	and	24.8	percent	was	living	
below	the	indigence	line	(INDEC	n.d.‐a).	Structural	changes	and	their	
impact	on	labour	markets	were	also	reflected	in	the	distribution	of	income:	
while	in	1974	the	poorest	decile	of	the	population	received	4	percent	of	the	
national	income,	by	2003	the	figure	was	only	1.9	percent.	In	contrast,	the	
richest	10	percent	of	the	population	saw	its	share	of	national	income	soar	
from	21.2	to	31.7	percent	over	the	same	period.	Moreover,	it	is	important	
to	note	that	while	poverty	levels	were	closely	related	to	the	growth	of	
unemployment	and	precariousness,	it	is	also	evident	that	work	itself	was	
not	sufficient	to	provide	for	the	satisfaction	of	basic	needs.	
	 Worsening	social	conditions	and	the	increasing	pressure	of	social	
mobilization	prompted	the	government	to	find	mechanisms	to	address	the	
demands	of	the	sectors	most	affected	by	the	employment	crisis.	As	a	
general	pattern,	though,	programs	implemented	to	provide	some	relief	did	
not	become	effective	means	for	sheltering	people	from	the	devastating	
consequences	of	neoliberalism.	Following	the	prescriptions	of	the	World	
Bank	and	the	IMF,	these	programs	targeted	a	very	specific	and	small	
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portion	of	the	population.	Thus,	for	example,	the	most	important	
employment	program	during	this	period,	Plan	Trabajar,	only	reached	
150,000	beneficiaries,	although	unemployment	affected	approximately	5	
million	people	at	the	time	(Ogando	2004).	It	was	only	after	the	momentous	
social	upheaval	and	political	crisis	of	2001‐2002	that	the	new	Program	for	
Unemployed	Heads	of	Family	(Programa	Jefes	y	Jefas	de	Hogares	
Desocupados),	with	a	much	broader	scope,	was	implemented.	This	program	
reached	2	million	beneficiaries	across	the	country	by	the	end	of	2002,	but	
it	did	not	overcome	the	limitations	of	previous	social	programs	with	
respect	to	the	extremely	low	level	of	benefits	it	provided.	Moreover,	it	did	
not	provide	healthcare	or	social	security	coverage	either.	In	a	similar	vein,	
in	the	early	1990s	the	government	instituted	an	unemployment	insurance	
program.	However,	by	1999	only	7	percent	of	unemployed	workers	
qualified	to	receive	the	very	low	benefits	the	program	offered	(CELS	2003,	
16).	In	short,	there	was	no	escape	from	the	poverty	that	neoliberalism	had	
imposed	on	a	very	large	segment	of	the	population.	Under	these	conditions,	
workers	did	not	have	many	options	other	than	accepting	the	precarious	
conditions	employers	were	increasingly	able	to	impose.	Either	because	the	
government	succeeded	in	passing	labour	legislation	that	regularized	forms	
of	precarious	employment,	or	because	of	the	high	levels	of	unemployment	
and	underemployment,	workers	were	forced	to	accept	jobs	that	did	not	
offer	any	kind	of	protection	under	the	law	or	provide	access	to	the	existing	
social	security	system.	Growing	informality,	precariousness,	
unemployment	and	the	widening	income	differential	between	workers	
experiencing	these	kinds	of	irregular	work	and	those	able	to	retain	formal	
employment	were	all	key	in	determining	the	growing	heterogeneity	of	the	
working	class.		
	
Nothing Would Be the Same: Workers and Labour Reform During the 1990s 
The	policies	put	forth	by	the	Peronist	administration	of	Carlos	Menem	
came	to	the	surprise	of	many	who	had	understood	his	victory	as	a	key	step	
in	a	return	to	the	party’s	more	traditional	concern	with	redistributive	
issues.	The	new	scenario	in	the	1990s	presented	the	powerful,	mainly	
Peronist	Confederation	of	Labour	(CGT,	Confederación	General	del	Trabajo)	
with	political	demands	and	challenges	to	which	it	was	only	partially	
equipped	to	respond.	First,	the	key	role	of	the	CGT	within	Peronism	and	its	
party	(the	Justicialist	Party),	in	effect	since	the	consolidation	of	Peronism	
as	the	central	political	force	in	Argentina	in	the	mid‐1940s,	had	been	in	
decline	since	the	1980s.	Menem’s	first	measures	in	government,	and	in	
particular	his	labour	reform	initiatives,	were	indeed	clear	manifestations	of	
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organized	labour’s	deteriorating	position	within	the	party	(Gutierrez	
2001).	
	 Nonetheless,	even	under	less	than	optimal	conditions,	the	CGT	was	
still	a	force	with	considerable	resources	at	its	disposal.	Specifically,	
through	its	representatives	and	allies	in	Congress,	it	was	able	to	block	
legislation	or	modify	bills	unacceptable	to	labour	leaders	in	their	original	
form.	Moreover,	it	was	the	ability	to	reach	consensus	with	the	CGT‐
affiliated	members	of	Congress	that	made	the	sanctioning	of	key	labour	
reform	bills	possible	(Etchemendy	and	Palermo	1998,	376).	Its	willingness	
to	negotiate	with	a	government	it	considered	its	ally	did	not	prevent	the	
CGT	from	using	more	pressure	when	it	deemed	it	necessary.	Thus,	after	
1996	the	CGT	called	a	number	of	general	strikes,	particularly	when	it	
became	concerned	that	the	reforms	were	threatening	areas	it	considered	
fundamental	to	its	institutional	integrity,	or	when	it	wanted	to	secure	its	
place	in	the	negotiation	of	labour	reforms.	In	general,	though,	its	
intervention	was	ineffectual	in	preventing	successive	reforms	that	
legalized	various	forms	of	precarious	employment	and	that	undermined	a	
number	of	key	labour	rights.	These	reforms	affected	labour	costs	in	very	
concrete	and	direct	ways	and	thus	became	increasingly	important	as	the	
national	currency	became	overvalued	during	the	1990s	and	pressure	to	
reduce	production	costs	mounted.	Particularly	significant	in	this	area	were	
reforms	aimed	at	reducing	the	contractual	obligations	of	employers,	
thereby	facilitating	both	the	creation	of	a	more	flexible	labour	force	by	
reducing	the	costs	of	hiring	and	firing	workers	as	well	as	the	use	of	
temporary	and	part‐time	workers.	These	conditions	also	curtailed	the	right	
to	strike	and	made	wage	increases	subject	to	sectoral	improvements	in	
productivity.5	
	 Menem	also	introduced	legislation	to	change	the	regulation	of	
collective	agreements	in	order	to	make	plant‐level	negotiations	possible.	
While	the	change	was	eventually	reverted	with	new	legislation	introduced	
in	1998,	in	practice,	unions	agreed	to	negotiate	at	the	plant	level,	in	many	
cases	accepting	reductions	in	wages	or	the	deterioration	of	general	
working	conditions	(Salvia	et	al.	2000,	62).	The	government	also	attempted	
to	undermine	the	monopoly	that	unions	had	exercised	on	the	provision	of	
health	and	welfare	services	by	allowing	private	competition	in	the	area.	
                                                 
5 The prohibition on granting wage increases not related to productivity gains was a pivotal 
aspect of the legal framework of Convertibility, aimed at eliminating price indexation (Bissio, 
Battistini, and Montes Cató 1999). The result was a virtual absence of wage bargaining during 
the decade. 
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However,	this	was	precisely	where	the	CGT	drew	the	line	on	what	it	was	
willing	to	accept,	and	thus	reforms	in	these	areas	did	not	prosper	during	
the	Menem	administration.		
	
Responding to Neoliberalism  
The	support	the	CGT	extended	to	many	of	Menem’s	reforms	and	the	
ineffective	opposition	it	presented	to	changes	that	undermined	several	of	
the	rights	that	workers	in	Argentina	had	accumulated	over	50	years	of	
struggle	put	the	CGT	in	a	particularly	weak	position.	The	CGT	also	faced	a	
new	scenario	in	terms	of	its	unity	and	its	effective	hold	on	its	monopoly	on	
representation	in	the	labour	movement.	The	CGT	had	faced	problems	of	
internal	division	several	times	before	in	its	history,	as	well	as	challenges	
from	strong	oppositional	movements	within	its	rank‐and‐file.	However,	in	
the	1990s,	the	leadership	of	the	CGT	was	forced	to	address	these	
challenges	under	conditions	that	increased	its	vulnerability:	its	diminished	
political	clout	within	the	party	and	the	increasing	heterogeneity	of	the	
working	class.	Under	the	weight	of	the	circumstances,	the	CGT	split	in	two	
from	1989	to	1991.	The	leaders	of	the	sectors	that	remained	closer	to	the	
government	benefitted	in	significant	ways	from	the	various	perks	
associated	with	their	relationship.		
	 An	important	faction	of	the	CGT	representing	unions	in	sectors	that	
had	been	less	affected	by	the	economic	transformation	during	the	1990s	
(in	particular,	services	and	transportation)	presented	a	much	more	open	
opposition	to	reforms.	The	leader	of	this	faction,	Hugo	Moyano,	became	a	
vocal	critic	of	the	reforms	that	Menem	introduced.	Moyano	would	later	
succeed	in	becoming	the	leader	of	the	re‐unified	CGT	in	2004,	which	once	
again	became	a	key	interlocutor	of	the	state	under	the	Kirchner	
administration.			
	 By	1992,	a	group	originally	composed	mostly	of	public‐sector	
unions	split	from	the	CGT	and	constituted	itself	as	an	independent	
organization	that	later	became	the	Central	of	Argentine	Workers	(CTA,	
Central	de	Trabajadores	de	la	Argentina).	This	organization’s	strategic	
effort	to	organize	the	increasingly	heterogeneous	working	class	
represented	a	new	and	vital	experience	for	the	labour	movement	in	
Argentina.	The	CTA	played	a	fundamental	role	in	this	respect,	and	while	its	
trajectory	after	the	2001	crisis	has	been	marked	by	tensions	and	internal	
conflicts,	its	decisive	participation	in	the	1990s	set	a	very	valuable	example	
of	more	progressive	and	innovative	forms	of	unionism.	An	important	factor	
in	the	CTA’s	success	was	the	incorporation	of	a	sector	of	unemployed	
workers,	the	Federation	of	Land,	Housing	and	Habitat	(FTV,	Federación	de	
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Tierra,	Vivienda	y		Hábitat),	under	the	leadership	of	Luis	D’Elia.	The	FTV	
was	but	one	of	the	many	organizations	of	the	unemployed	that	emerged	
during	the	1990s	as	alternative	forms	of	organizing	the	growing	mass	of	
workers	who	faced	unemployment	and	who	had	been	most	negatively	
affected	by	changes	in	the	labour	market.	The	piquetero	movement,	as	it	
became	known,	was	and	remains	a	very	heterogeneous	movement,	
representing	organizations	with	diverse	political	backgrounds	and	
organizational	strategies	(Svampa	and	Pereyra	2003).	
	 While	the	sum	of	the	conditions	outlined	above—growing	
instability	in	labour	markets,	increasing	poverty,	weakness	in	workers’	
organizations—pointed	to	a	juncture	hardly	conducive	to	the	effective	
defence	of	labour	rights,	in	fact	workers	presented	a	major	challenge	to	the	
policies	of	the	Menem	administration.	Interestingly,	resistance	to	
neoliberalism	was	articulated	through	the	emergence	of	new	actors,	in	
particular	the	CTA	and	the	piquetero	movement.	It	is,	then,	toward	these	
organizations	that	we	would	like	to	focus	our	attention.		
	
Workers’ Struggles and the Collapse of Convertibility 
In	its	original	form,	the	CTA	brought	together	large	unions	within	the	
public	sector,	in	particular	the	Association	of	Public	Workers	(ATE,	
Asociación	de	Trabajadores	del	Estado)	and	the	Central	of	Education	
Workers	(CTERA,	Confederación	de	Trabajadores	de	la	Educación	de	la	
República	Argentina).	During	the	1990s,	the	CTA	grew	to	encompass	other	
unions	in	different	sectors	of	the	economy,	but	its	most	important	area	of	
expansion	was	in	sectors	outside	the	traditional	sphere	of	union	affiliation,	
in	particular	the	unemployed	and	also	the	precariously	employed.	Part	of	
its	growing	strength	during	this	period	was	related	to	its	practice	of	
individual	forms	of	affiliation,	as	opposed	to	the	traditional	model	based	on	
the	representation	of	constituted	unions.		
The	CTA	was	effective	in	attracting	a	very	wide	range	of	workers,	including	
the	unemployed,	underemployed,	self‐employed,	retirees,	workers	in	
worker‐run	enterprises,	and	those	employed	in	the	formal	sector.	Almost	
paradoxically,	the	influence	the	CTA	achieved	until	2001	was	undermined	
by	the	political	events	of	the	post‐Convertibility	period	and	the	unfolding	
of	a	new	phase	in	workers’	struggles	under	conditions	of	rapid	and	
sustained	economic	growth.	
	 Nonetheless,	during	the	1990s,	organizations	like	the	CTA	were	
instrumental	in	facilitating	the	lines	of	communication	among	various	
sectors	within	the	working	class.	The	CTA	represented,	in	this	respect,	a	
major	anti‐neoliberal	effort	to	bring	together	a	range	of	demands	from	
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sectors	affected	in	particular	ways	by	the	process	of	restructuring	and	to	
articulate	them	through	various	but	coordinated	forms	of	struggle	and	
protest	during	the	1990s.	Vital	in	accounting	for	the	achievements	of	the	
CTA	as	an	organizational	alternative	for	the	working	class	was	its	influence	
among	the	movement	of	the	unemployed.		
	 For	those	without	a	job,	forms	of	protest	that	had	previously	been	
only	marginal	became	extremely	important	as	they	gained	a	growing	
capacity	to	organize.	In	particular,	the	disruption	of	highways	and	bridges,	
and	in	some	cases	land	occupations,	became	central	in	staging	demands	
articulated	around	the	most	urgent	community	needs:	work	programs	and	
their	extension	and	renewal,	the	distribution	of	food	assistance,	and	the	
reduction	in	public	service	fees.	
	 Key	actors	in	the	earliest	piquetes	in	the	1990s	were	skilled	workers	
in	the	country’s	interior	provinces.	Roadblocks	became	a	fundamental	part	
of	mass	protests,	emerging	in	several	regions	hit	very	hard	by	the	
privatization	of	public	enterprises,	which	until	then	had	provided	the	main	
source	of	employment.	In	some	cases,	roadblocks	also	became	central	to	
organizing	mass	demonstrations	against	wage	payment	delays	for	public	
sector	employees	as	provincial	governments	faced	increasing	fiscal	
problems.	Progressively,	piquetes	became	the	most	common	form	of	
protest	in	the	poorer	areas	around	the	city	of	Buenos	Aires	and	later	in	
other	urban	centres	critically	affected	by	the	growth	of	unemployment.	In	
the	process,	they	also	became	disassociated	with	the	workplace	of	those	
involved,	quite	clearly	because	for	the	majority	of	piqueteros	there	simply	
was	no	workplace.		
	 The	growing	presence	and	significance	of	piquetero	organizations	
became	one	of	the	most	important	political	events	of	the	1990s,	as	they	
gained	not	only	momentum	in	their	struggles	but	also	legitimacy	as	
political	actors.	The	rapid	expansion	of	the	Argentinian	economy	since	
2003	and	the	resulting	reduction	in	unemployment	goes	a	long	way	to	
explaining	the	waning	significance	of	the	piquetero	movement	since	then.	
Nonetheless,	there	were	some	features	in	the	development	of	the	
organizations	of	the	unemployed	that	also	account	for	their	diminishing	
capacity	to	organize	workers	only	precariously	inserted	in	the	labour	
market.		
	 One	key	problem	was	related	to	the	difficulties	that	piqueteros	
encountered	in	coordinating	their	struggles.	Thus,	while	we	usually	refer	to	
them	as	a	“movement”,	in	practice	the	organizations	remained	marked	by	
deep	lines	of	division	regarding	politics	as	well	as	strategies	of	
organization	and	representation.	The	propensity	and	willingness	to	
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maintain	open	communication	with	the	government	was	another	major	
line	dividing	these	organizations	(Epstein	2003,	20‐21).	Differences	
regarding	relations	with	the	government	became	even	deeper	after	the	
election	of	Néstor	Kirchner	to	the	presidency	in	2003.	Finally,	some	of	
these	organizations	took	on	a	key	role	in	the	distribution	of	work	
programs,	and	this	was	the	source	of	a	considerable	amount	of	conflict,	
since	the	government	thus	acquired	important	leverage	with	which	to	
further	influence,	control	and	divide	these	organizations.	Nevertheless,	
piquetero	organizations	varied	considerably	in	terms	of	size	and	
organizational	strength,	so	the	influence	of	the	government	and	other	local	
actors	on	them	was	also	wide‐ranging	(Svampa	and	Pereyra	2003,	90).	
	 Notwithstanding	their	differences	and	their	eventual	downfall,	it	is	
still	important	to	point	out	the	crucial	role	of	all	these	organizations	in	
configuring	an	essential	space	for	the	emergence	of	a	common	identity	
among	their	participants.	In	particular,	they	provided	a	new	social	meaning	
to	their	experience	of	being	“excluded”,	giving	the	movement	a	specific	
political	potential	at	the	time	(Cross	and	Montes	Cató	2002,	92‐93).	This	
was	no	minor	achievement,	particularly	considering	the	visibility	these	
organizations	gave	to	the	plight	of	a	broad	sector	of	society	so	negatively	
affected	by	neoliberalism.		
	 The	lack	of	a	political	force	that	could	provide	broader	content	to	
the	demands	emanating	from	this	sector	was	one	of	the	most	serious	
deficits	of	the	time.	Nonetheless,	the	CTA	as	a	union	central	was	capable	of	
contributing	vitally	to	the	promotion	of	alternatives	that	attempted	to	
inject	the	protests	around	unemployment	and	poverty	with	broader	
political	objectives.	In	the	months	leading	up	to	the	uprising	of	December	
2001,	for	example,	the	CTA	was	a	key	force	behind	the	organization	and	
coordination	of	mass	protests	that	brought	the	unemployed	together	
through	roadblocks	and	mass	demonstrations	in	downtown	Buenos	Aires,	
along	with	public	sector	employee	and	teacher	strikes	and	other	forms	of	
community‐based	protests	such	as	cacerolazos	(pot‐banging	protests).	
Probably	the	most	important	outcome	of	these	days	of	protest	was	the	
confirmation	of	the	role	of	organizations	of	the	unemployed	as	leaders	in	
the	opposition	to	the	government’s	adjustment	plans.		
	 It	is	impossible	to	account	for	the	events	of	December	2001	without	
understanding	the	pivotal	role	that	workers’	organizations	acquired	in	
mobilizing	opposition	to	policies	that	had	taken	Argentina	to	a	crisis	of	
such	enormous	proportions.	The	political	events	that	have	unfolded	since	
have	created	a	radically	different	political	scenario,	with	challenges	of	its	
own	for	the	working	class.	Yet,	as	problematic	and	contradictory	as	the	
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process	has	been,	what	is	beyond	doubt	is	the	loss	of	the	consensus	that	
free‐market	policies	once	enjoyed	and	the	key	role	played	by	labour	
mobilization	in	producing	this	outcome.	
	
Beyond Neoliberalism?  
Argentina’s	trajectory	during	the	1990s	points	to	the	centrality	of	policies	
that,	as	it	happened	in	so	many	countries	at	the	time,	profoundly	
transformed	the	nature	of	the	intervention	of	the	state	in	the	economy	and	
the	objectives	of	its	regulatory	role.	The	depth	of	the	crisis	Argentina	faced	
early	in	that	decade,	the	particular	characteristics	of	the	stabilization	plan	
designed	to	address	it,	and	the	intensity	with	which	reforms	were	carried	
forward	also	indicate	the	necessity	of	understanding	local	conditions	in	the	
determination	of	the	contours	neoliberalism	acquired	in	particular	cases.	
	Acknowledging	the	deep	political	crisis	that	affected	the	legitimacy	
of	the	state	in	2001,	Néstor	Kirchner	and	Cristina	Fernández	de	Kirchner	
(2007‐2011)	have	rejected	international	and	domestic	pressures	to	both	
resume	the	path	of	neoliberal	structural	adjustment	and	eliminate	newly	
introduced	regulations	that	have	partially	isolated	the	Argentinian	
economy	from	the	volatility	of	global	finance.		
The	higher	exchange	rate	has	resulted	in	a	drastic	reduction	of	
domestic	costs	(including	labour	costs)	and	created	more	favourable	
conditions	for	a	process	of	import	substitution	and	industrial	
revitalization.	Likewise,	a	more	competitive	exchange	rate	and	rising	
international	prices	for	the	country’s	agricultural	and	agroindustrial	
products	have	resulted	in	a	sustained	growth	of	exports.	Through	the	
imposition	of	a	tax	on	the	exports	of	primary	goods,	the	state	has	
appropriated	part	of	the	foreign	exchange	windfall.	This,	in	turn,	has	
helped	to	solve	the	twin	deficit	(external	and	fiscal)	that	affected	the	
country	during	the	previous	decade	of	currency	overvaluation.	Finally,	the	
reversal	of	the	decade‐long	fiscal	hardship	and	the	political	crisis	of	the	
discourse	of	fiscal	austerity	have	given	the	state	a	renewed	role	in	
subsidizing	diverse	economic	activities	and	expanding	welfare	and	social	
security	benefits	for	diverse	groups.		
This	cycle	of	growth	has	not	been	free	of	tensions.	The	economic	
recovery	and	the	drop	in	unemployment	made	room	for	renewed	union	
strength	and	wage	demands.	The	latter,	along	with	growing	domestic	
consumption	and	the	oligopolistic	nature	of	some	markets	for	mass	
consumption	goods,	have	created	strong	inflationary	pressures.		Rising	
inflation	has	been	at	the	centre	of	economic	policymaking	and	political	
controversy.		
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Closely	related	to	the	priority	given	to	growth	and	the	rejection	of	
pressures	to	resume	the	path	of	adjustment	and	austerity,	policies	in	the	
area	of	labour	relations	acquired	a	particularly	critical	significance	in	the	
wake	of	the	crisis	in	employment,	the	alarming	levels	of	poverty	and	the	
demands	of	organizations	representing	precarious	and	unemployed	
workers	in	the	early	2000s.	Reducing	unemployment	was	clearly	a	central	
priority,	but	addressing	poverty	also	demanded	an	improvement	in	wages	
and	specific	welfare	policies	that	targeted	the	working	poor.	Initially,	the	
government	relied	on	presidential	decrees	granting	lump‐sum	wage	
increases	for	all	(Orovitz	Sanmartino	2010).	These	across‐the‐board	
increases	partially	offset	the	effects	of	inflation	and	improved	the	wages	of	
formal	workers	as	well	as	some	sectors	among	the	precariously	employed.	
Since	2004,	collective	bargaining	between	workers	and	employers	with	the	
mediation	of	the	state	has	gained	momentum	and	has	cemented	the	trend	
toward	a	significant	improvement	of	salaries	among	registered	workers.	
Moreover,	some	of	the	labour	flexibilization	measures	introduced	during	
the	de	la	Rúa	government	have	been	reversed.	Precarious	workers	have	
also	benefited	from	some	wage	improvement	in	connection	to	the	increase	
in	the	legal	minimum	wage	and	the	rise	in	salaries,	but	their	wages	are	
increasingly	lower	than	the	salaries	of	formal	workers	(Chitarroni	and	
Cimillo	2007,	7‐8).		
Nonetheless,	salaries	have	also	been	slow	in	recovering.	Taking	
1970	as	the	base	year,	the	average	real	wage	reached	the	lowest	point	in	
2003	(54.8	percent	of	the	1970	level).	It	gradually	rose	to	69	percent	in	
2006,	but	without	reaching	the	level	of	the	mid‐1990s	(88.6	percent	of	the	
base	year	in	1994)	(Graña	and	Kennedy	2008).	A	clear	expression	of	the	
losses	workers	have	experienced	is	the	fact	that	in	2006,	unemployment	
dropped	to	a	level	similar	to	that	of	1993,	but	the	number	of	households	
below	the	poverty	line	was	50	percent	higher	(Graña	et	al.	2008).	Inflation	
is	an	important	factor	explaining	the	gap	between	economic	growth	and	
the	evolution	of	real	wages	and	other	social	indicators.	The	
implementation	in	2009	of	a	child	subsidy	for	families	of	those	
unemployed,	informally	employed	or	self‐employed	with	salaries	below	
the	minimum	wage	has	had	some	impact	in	raising	family	income,	but	
again,	inflation	might	undermine	some	of	its	anti‐poverty	potential.	
To	fight	informality,	the	government	has	concentrated	its	efforts	on	
simplifying	the	procedures	for	registering	workers,	on	implementing	a	tax	
moratorium	for	employers	that	registered	their	workers	and	on	
intensifying	audits.	These	policies	have	been	effective	among	unregistered	
workers	within	formal	firms.	However,	many	other	precarious	workers	
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who	form	segments	of	the	informal	sector	remain	trapped	in	situations	of	
vulnerability.	They	are	part	of	the	growing	number	of	very	small	
companies,	family	firms	and	self‐employed	workers	linked	to	larger	firms	
in	the	formal	sector	through	the	outsourcing	of	activities	(Gioza	Zuazúa	
2007,	332‐334).	Thus,	although	85	percent	of	the	jobs	created	between	
2003	and	2008	were	registered	formally,	precarious	workers	still	
represent	36.5	percent	of	the	workforce	(Orovitz	Sanmartino	2010).	This	
figure	is	still	considerably	higher	than	the	level	in	1991,	when	informal	
workers	represented	30	percent	of	the	workforce,	which	was	already	a	
major	increase	from	the	19	percent	in	1980	(Chitarroni	and	Cimillo	2007,	
6).		
	 As	we	have	suggested,	changes	since	2003	cannot	be	fully	
understood	without	taking	into	account	the	fundamental	role	of	social	
mobilization	in	delegitimizing	the	previous	consensus	on	neoliberalism.	In	
the	same	way,	the	course	that	economic	change	has	taken	in	the	post‐
Convertibility	period	must	be	considered	in	terms	of	the	political	context	
that	has	made	it	possible.	The	transformation	of	the	labour	movement	has	
been	particularly	important.	As	part	of	the	government’s	support	for	re‐
establishing	the	central	role	of	collective	bargaining	in	the	determination	
of	wages,	the	CGT,	under	the	leadership	of	Hugo	Moyano,	has	effectively	
repositioned	itself	as	the	hegemonic	labour	representative	in	the	country.	
The	new	strength	of	the	CGT	does	not	imply	that	it	has	been	able	to	
effectively	represent	all	workers’	struggles	or	the	plight	of	precarious	
workers,	but	this	has	not	prevented	it	from	regaining	the	privileged	role	it	
historically	enjoyed	as	the	main	interlocutor	between	the	working	class	
and	the	state.	
	 The	demands	of	many	of	the	organizations	of	the	unemployed	also	
encountered	a	very	different	response	under	the	government	of	Néstor	
Kirchner.	Partly	because	of	the	government’s	recognition	of	the	demands	
raised	by	these	sectors	and	also	because	of	the	political	significance	of	
representing	them,	organizations	within	the	piquetero	movement	were	
drawn	within	the	spheres	of	the	state	in	a	process	that	emerged	as	a	new,	
viable	channel	to	influence	policymaking.		This	was	not	simply	an	issue	of	
co‐optation	or	clientelism,	but	rather	an	alternative	way	to	institutionalize	
the	demands	of	these	organizations	in	a	moment	when	increasing	the	basis	
of	support	was	critical	for	the	government.		
	 The	CTA’s	transition	into	this	new	stage	was	profoundly	affected	by	
the	two	previous	transformations	in	the	universe	of	labour	politics:	the	
demobilization	of	the	organizations	of	the	unemployed	and	precariously	
employed	and	the	reaffirmation	of	the	position	of	the	CGT	within	the	
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government.	These	new	conditions	produced	important	new	tensions	and	
divisions	within	the	organization	that	also	revealed	some	of	the	
fundamental	weaknesses	in	the	trajectory	of	the	CTA.	In	particular,	its	
decision	to	become	a	political	movement	in	2002	turned	the	problem	of	
finding	a	common	ground	to	represent	a	more	democratic	segment	of	the	
labour	movement	into	a	function	of	its	ability	to	innovate	politically.	
However,	all	the	CTA’s	new	role	as	a	political	force	achieved	was	to	
encourage	its	leaders	to	participate	within	other	political	parties,	thus	
constituting	another	factor	in	the	development	of	deep	cleavages	within	
the	organization	(Patroni	2008).	Deep	disagreements	within	the	CTA	also	
exist	with	respect	to	a	government	that	positions	itself	as	progressive	but	
has	supported	the	rebuilding	of	the	central	role	of	traditional	unionism.		
To	conclude,	the	persistent	fragmentation	of	the	working	class	is	
one	of	the	key	characteristics	of	the	current	process	of	development	in	
Argentina.	It	coincides	with	a	moment	of	uncertainty	with	respect	to	
different	alternatives	within	organizations	of	the	working	class	and	their	
capacity	to	structure	their	struggle	around	precariousness.	It	is	doubtful	
that	further	economic	growth	by	itself	can	address	the	problem,	as	it	is	
logical	to	suspect	an	important	correlation	between	informality	and	the	
accumulation	requirements	of	capitalism	in	Argentina	today.	In	this	
respect,	debates	over	whether	the	post‐Convertibility	administrations	have	
distanced	themselves	from	neoliberalism	are	in	many	respects	misguided.	
The	change	is	evident,	although	this	does	not	preclude	the	existence	of	
important	continuities.	In	our	view,	a	much	more	relevant	question	is	the	
degree	to	which	structural	changes	in	the	economy	since	the	1970s	can	be	
reversed,	given	the	distribution	of	power	in	Argentina	and	the	dynamism	
of	its	new	stage	of	economic	growth	and	insertion	into	international	
markets.	Regarding	the	structure	of	labour	markets,	the	persistence	of	very	
high	levels	of	precarious	employment	points	to	the	deep‐seated	
transformation	in	the	economy	brought	about	by	neoliberal	reforms,	which	
might	lie	beyond	the	space	of	viable	change,	even	for	a	more	progressive	
government.		
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